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Abstract
We use the system of p-adic numbers for the description of infor-
mation processes. Basic objects of our models are so called trans-
formers of information, basic processes are information processes, the
statistics are information statistics (thus we present a model of in-
formation reality). The classical and quantum mechanical formalisms
on information p-adic spaces are developed. It seems that classical
and quantum mechanical models on p-adic information spaces can be
applied for the investigation of flows of information in cognitive and
social systems, since a p-adic metric gives quite natural description of
the ability to form associations.
1This research was supported by the grant ”Strategical Investigations” of the University
of Va¨xjo¨ and the visiting professor fellowship at the University of Clermont-Ferrand.
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1 Introduction
We develop classical and quantum formalisms on information spaces. Basic
objects of this model are so called transformers of information; basic pro-
cesses are information processes. Our main aim is a description of classical
and quantum dynamics of information states.
This information dynamics may be fruitful in the study of cognitive, psy-
chological and social processes. Here flows of information are more important
than flows of matter. We think that it would be possible to explain some
aspects of the process of thinking and psychological, social and anomalous
phenomena on the basis of our model. Thus the readers who are only in-
terested in applications to cognitive sciences, sociology and psychology may
consider our model as only a new apparatus to investigate these phenomena.
Our model of information reality can be considered as an attempt to
extend the standard model of physical reality. We interpret material objects
as a particular class of transformers of information (which are characterized
by stable or slowly changing information states). On the other hand, our
model might be used for the description of information flows which are not
directly related to flows of matter. These are conscious, social (and even
anomalous) information processes.
Different models of information and cognitive reality have been discussed
by many scientists in relation to foundations of quantum physics [1]-[7], cog-
nitive sciences and psychology [8]- [11] and anomalous phenomena [12]-[17].
We use a new mathematical apparatus to describe information reality
(”the world of ideas”). Many authors discuss the idea that such ”ideal”
objects as ideas, consciousness, information can play an important role to
provide the right picture of physical reality. However, typically they use
(with some modifications) the standard mathematical model based on the
description of physical reality by real numbers. In particular, many of them
discuss a ”conscious field”, but they try to describe this object as a new field
on the standard real space-time. We think that some of cognitive processes
could not be described by using the real model of physical reality. There
is simply no place for such phenomena in this model. The real model was
created to describe a particular class of physical phenomena (material ob-
jects). This model does not play an exceptional role. We need not try to
input all physical phenomena into this real model of reality. There can be
other models of physical reality. We propose to describe physical reality by
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using information spaces (see Appendix 1).
From our viewpoint real spaces (Newton’s absolute space or spaces of
general relativity) give only a particular class of information spaces. These
real information spaces are characterized by the special system for the coding
of information and the special distance on the space of vectors of information.
Any natural number m > 1 can be chosen as the basis of the coding system.
Each x ∈ [0, 1] can be presented in the form:
x = a0a1...an... , (1)
where aj = 1, ..., m− 1, are digits. We denote the set of all sequences of the
form (1) by the symbol Xm. For example, let us fix m = 10. One of the main
properties of the real cording system is the identification of the form:
10...0... = 09...9... ; 010....0... = 009...9... ; ... (2)
In fact, this identification is closely connected with the order structure
on the real line R (and the metric related to this order structure). For each
x, there exist ”right” and ”left” neighborhoods; there exist arbitrary small
right and left shifts. The identification (2) is connected with the description
of left neighborhoods.
Example 1.1. Let x = 10...0... . Then x can be approximated from
the left hand side with an arbitrary precision by numbers of the form y =
09...90... .
The following description of right neighborhoods will be very important
in our further considerations.
(AS) Let x = a0...am... . Then the numbers (vectors of information) which
are close to the x from the right hand side have the form y = b0...bm..., where
a0 = b0, ..., am = bm for sufficiently large m.
This nearness has a natural information interpretation: (AS) implies the
ability to form associations for cognitive systems which use this nearness to
compare vectors of information. By (AS) two communications (two ideas
in a model of human thinking, [18] - [20]) which have the same codes for
sufficiently large number of first (the most important) positions in cording
sequences are identified by a comparator of a cognitive system.
Numbers (vectors of information) which are close to x from the left hand
side could not be characterized in the same way (see Example 1.1, there x
and y are very close but their codes differ strongly).
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Conclusion. The system of real numbers has been created as a coding
system for information which the consciousness receives from reality. The
main properties of this coding system are the order structure on the set of
information vectors2 and the restricted ability (see (AS) ) to form associa-
tions.
Finally, we pay attention to the ”universal coding property” of the real
system: any natural number m > 1 can be used as the basis of this system.
Thus it is assumed that any information process can be equivalently described
by using, for example, 2-bits coding or 1997-bits coding.
All these properties of the real coding system were incorporated in every
physical model 3.
I do not think that all information processes have an order structure. On
the other hand, the scale of coding system m > 1 may play an important
role in a description of an information process.
Let us ”modify” the real coding system. We eliminate the identification
(2). Since now, there is no order structure on the set Xm of information
vectors. We consider on Xm the nearness defined by (AS)
4. This nearness
can be described by a metric. The corresponding (complete) metric space is
isomorphic to the ring of so called m-adic integers Zm (see [21] and section 2).
Therefore it is natural to use m-adic numbers for a description of information
processes. Mathematically it is convenient to use prime numbers m = p > 1
(see [21]). We arrive to the domain of an extended mathematical formalism,
p-adic analysis.
To use p-adic numbers in physics is not a new idea (see [22] - [40]). A new
idea is to use them for a description of information (in particular, cognitive
[18]) processes. On the other hand, apparatus which has been developed in
p-adic quantum physics may be fruitfully used in our model.
We develop a quantum formalism for information systems. The mathe-
matical basis for this formalism has been presented in [29], [18], [37], [34],
[35]. In this paper we apply the p-adic quantum formalism to information
systems. As in ordinary quantum mechanics over the reals, the problem of an
interpretation plays the important role in information quantum mechanics.
2Of course, the idea about an order structure is a consequence of properties of the
special system which is used for observations of reality.
3From this point of view there is no large difference between Newton’s absolute space
and real manifolds used in general relativity.
4Thus here all information is considered from the viewpoint of associations.
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Of course, all difficulties of an interpretation of the ordinary quantum theory
(see, for example, [6], [41] – [45]) are reproduced in the information quantum
theory. There are many viewpoints on an interpretation of the quantum the-
ory (which may be very different). However, they are mainly based on the
following two general interpretations of a quantum state: (1) an individual
(or orthodox Copenhagen) interpretation by which a quantum state provides
the complete description an individual quantum system; (2) an ensemble (or
statistical) interpretation by which a quantum state provides the description
of a statistical ensemble of quantum systems. In fact, by analysing the pro-
cess of measurement for information quantum systems we understood that
we have to follow the ensemble interpretation. This analysis might be also
useful for better understanding of the ordinary quantum formalism on real
space.
2 Systems of p-adic numbers
First we present some facts about p-adic numbers.
The field of real numbers R is constructed as the completion of the field
of rational numbers Q with respect to the metric ρ(x, y) = |x−y|, where |·| is
the usual valuation given by the absolute value. The fields of p-adic numbers
Qp are constructed in a corresponding way, but using other valuations. For a
prime number p, the p-adic valuation |·|p is defined in the following way. First
we define it for natural numbers. Every natural number n can be represented
as the product of prime numbers, n = 2r23r3 · · · prp · · ·, and we define |n|p =
p−rp, writing |0|p = 0 and |−n|p = |n|p. We then extend the definition of the
p-adic valuation | · |p to all rational numbers by setting |n/m|p = |n|p/|m|p
for m 6= 0. The completion of Q with respect to the metric ρp(x, y) = |x−y|p
is the locally compact field of p-adic numbers Qp. The number fields R and
Qp are unique in a sense, since by Ostrovsky’s theorem (see [21]) | · | and | · |p
are the only possible valuations on Q, but have quite distinctive properties.
Unlike the absolute value distance | · |, the p-adic valuation satisfies the
strong triangle inequality |x+ y|p ≤ max[|x|p, |y|p], x, y ∈ Qp
Write Ur(a) = {x ∈ Qp : |x− a|p ≤ r} and U−r (a) = {x ∈ Qp : |x− a|p <
r}, where r = pn and n = 0, ±1, ±2, . . .. These are the “closed” and “open”
balls in Qp while the sets Sr(a) = {x ∈ K : |x− a|p = r} are the spheres in
Qp of such radii r. These sets (balls and spheres) have a somewhat strange
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topological structure from the viewpoint of our usual Euclidean intuition:
they are both open and closed at the same time, and as such are called
clopen sets. Another interesting property of p-adic balls is that two balls
have nonempty intersection if and only if one of them is contained in the
other. Also, we note that any point of a p-adic ball can be chosen as its
center, so such a ball is thus not uniquely characterized by its center and
radius. Finally, any p-adic ball Ur(0) is an additive subgroup of Qp, while
the ball U1(0) is also a ring, which is called the ring of p-adic integers and is
denoted by Zp.
Any x ∈ Qp has a unique canonical expansion (which converges in the
| · |p–norm) of the form x = a−n/pn + · · · a0 + · · ·+ akpk + · · · where the aj
∈ {0, 1, . . . , p− 1} are the “digits” of the p-adic expansion. The elements x
∈ Zp have the expansion x = a0 + · · ·+ akpk + · · · and can thus be identified
with the sequences of digits x = a0...ak....
The p-adic exponential function ex =
∑∞
n=0
xn
n!
. The series converges in
Qp if
|x|p ≤ rp, where rp = 1/p, p 6= 2 and r2 = 1/4. (3)
p-adic trigonometric functions sin x and cos x are defined by the standard
power series. These series have the same radius of convergence rp as the
exponential series.
If, instead of a prime number p, we start with an arbitrary natural num-
ber m > 1 we construct the system of so called m-adic numbers Qm by
completing Q with respect to the m-adic metric ρm(x, y) = |x − y|m which
is defined in a similar way to above. However, this system is in general not
a field as there may exist divisors of zero.
3 Dynamics on information spaces
The rings of p-adic integers Zp can be used as mathematical models for
information spaces. Each element x =
∑∞
j=0 αjp
j can be identified with a
sequence
x = α0α1 · · ·αN · · · , αj = 0, 1, . . . , p− 1. (4)
Such sequences are interpreted as coding sequences (in the alphabet Ap =
{0, 1, . . . , p − 1} with p letters) for some amounts of information. The p-
adic metric ρp(x, y) = |x − y|p on Zp corresponds to the nearness (AS) for
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information sequences. We choose the space X = Zp (or multidimensional
spaces X = ZNp ) for the description of information. The X is said to be
information space.
Everywhere below we shall use the abbreviation ”I” for the word infor-
mation (for example, information space = I-space).
Remark 3.1. Different information phenomena can be described by
different mathematical models for I-spaces. The p-adic model for I-spaces is
the simplest from the mathematical point of view.
Objects which ”live” in I-spaces are said to be transformers of informa-
tion (I-transformers). I-transformers are not characterized by localization in
information p-adic space (or real space). They are characterized by the abil-
ity to receive an external information and transform it in a new information.
Each I-transformer τ has internal clocks. A state of the clocks is described
by an I-vector t ∈ T = Zp which is called information time. The I-time can
have different interpretations in different I-models. If τ is a conscious system
then t is (self-recognized) time of the evolution of this system. We can say
about psychological time of an individual or about (collective) social time
of a group of individuals. In fact, we have not to image t as an ordered
sequence of time counts. This is only information with describes evolution
of τ. In principle, there is no direct relation between I-time and ”physical”
time that is used in the model over the reals.
At each instant t ∈ T of I-time there is defined a total information state
(I-state) q(t) ∈ X of τ. It describes the position of τ in the I-space X . The
”life”-trajectory of τ can be identified with the trajectory q(t) in X .
An I-transformer can be imagine as a kind of Turing machine. Let us consider
a free I-transformer τfr (i.e., an I-transformer which does not interact with other
I-transformers and I-fields). At the instant of I-time t the τfr has the I-state
q(t) = (α0(t), α1(t), ..., αk(t), ...) (an infinite ribbon with symbols belonging to
the alphabet Ap = {0, 1, ..., p − 1}). During an I-time interval ∆t this state is
transformed in a new state q(t+∆t) = (α0(t+∆t), α1(t+∆t), ..., αk(t+∆t), ...)
(a new infinite ribbon with symbols belonging to the alphabet Ap). The law of
transformation depends on internal I-parameters s which determine the internal
structure of τfr. In the general case an I-transformer τ interact with other I-
transformers τj , j = 1, ..., N and I-fields φi(x), i = 1, ...,M. These interactions
change continuously internal I-parameters s = s(t, qτj (t)), φi(qτ (t))).
For example, a cognitive system τ which is isolated from external I-flows can be
considered as a free I-transformer τfr. Here q(t) gives the evolution of τfr in ‘space
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of ideas’; I-parameters s are determined by the neural structure of τfr. In general
case the cognitive system τfr interact with other cognitive systems and material
objects (the latter interactions are also considered by τfr as I-interactions) and
I-fields. These interactions change continuously (with respect to I-time of τfr) the
transformation law, q(t)→ q(t+∆t).
We consider now the motion of a material particle τ from the I-viewpoint. At
the moment we restrict our consideration to classical one dimensional motions.
We identify the total I-state q of a particle τ with the spatial coordinate of this
particle. q ∈ Zp has the form q = α0+α1p+ · · ·+αmpm+ · · · . This representation
can be considered as the expansion of the distance q in the p-scale. The main
difference from the real model of the motion of τ is discreetness of space. There
is the minimal length element l = 1. The particle τ could not be observed on
distances which are less than l = 1. Other difference is that q can yield infinitely
large values (these are q for which αj 6= 0 for an infinite number of j). Thus the
realization of I-space as spatial space does not reproduce the ordinary model of
motion in continuous real space. It gives a model of motion in discrete space. The
ordinary physical interactions can realized in this space (see [18], [29], [34]-[36]).
In this way they can be interpreted as I-interactions.
We develop an analogue of the Hamiltonian dynamics on the I-spaces
5 As usual, we introduce the quantity p(t) = q˙(t) (= d
dt
q(t)) which is the
information analogue of the momentum. However, here we prefer to use a
physiological terminology. The quantity p(t) is said to be a motivation (for
changing of the I-state q(t)).
The space Zp ×Zp of points z = (q, p) where q is the I-state and p is the
motivation is said to be a phase I-space. As in the ordinary Hamiltonian
formalism, we assume that there exists a function H(q, p) (I-Hamiltonian)
on the phase I-space which determines the motion of τ in the phase I-space:
q˙(t) =
∂H
∂p
(q(t), p(t)), q(t0) = q0, (5)
p˙(t) = −∂H
∂q
(q(t), p(t)), p(t0) = p0. (6)
The I-Hamiltonian H(p, q) has the meaning of an I-energy. In principle,
I-energy is not related to the usual physical energy.
5In fact, this is an application to the I-theory of the Hamiltonian p-adic formalism
developed in [26] (and generalized in [29]).
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If τ is a (material) particle, then (5), (6) gives the Hamiltonian dynamics for
the particle; here q(t) is the spatial coordinate of the particle in discrete space and
p(t) is the momentum of the particle (which is also discrete). If τ is a cognitive
system, then (5), (6) gives the Hamiltonian dynamics for the cognitive system in
the ‘space of ideas’.
The simplest I-Hamiltonian Hfr(p) = αp
2, α ∈ Zp describes the mo-
tion of a free I-transformation τ , i.e., an I-transformer which uses only self-
motivations for changing of its I-state q(t). Here by solving the system of
the Hamiltonian equations we obtain: p(t) = p0, q(t) = q0 + 2αp0(t− t0) 6.
The motivation p is the constant of this motion. Thus the free I-transformer
”does not like” to change its motivation p0 in the process of the motion in
the I-space. If, we change coordinates, q′ = (q − q0)/k, k = 2αp0, then we
see that the dynamics of the free I-transformer coincides with the dynamics
of its I-time.
If τ is a (material) particle, then p0 is its momentum and α = 1/2m, where
m(= m0 + m1p + · · · + mlpl) is the mass of τ (which determined with a finite
precision). If τ is a cognitive system, then p0 is (internal) motivation of τ and
α = 1/2m, where m is so called I-mass (see section 4).
In general case the I-energy is the sum of the I-energy of motivations
Hf = αp
2 (which is an analogue of the kinetic energy) and potential I-energy
V (q):
H(q, p) = αp2 + V (q).
The potential V (q) is determined by fields of information.
In the Hamiltonian framework we can consider interactions between I-
transformers τ1, . . . , τN . These I-transformers have the I-times t1, . . . , tN
and I-states q1(t1), . . . , qN(tN ). By our model we can describe interactions
between these I-transformers only in the case in that there is a possibility
to choose the same I-time t for all of them. In this case we can consider the
evolution of the system of the I-transformers τ1, . . . , τN as a trajectory in the
I-space ZNp = Zp × · · · × Zp, q(t) = (q1(t), . . . , qN(t)).
We think that this conditions of consistency for I-times of interacting
I-transformers plays the crucial role in many psychological experiments. We
can not obtain sensible observations for interactions between arbitrary indi-
6In fact, this simplest I-system is not trivial from the mathematical viewpoint. There
exist other solutions which are nonanalytic (but smooth), see [21], [46]. These solutions
may also have an interesting I-interpretation. We shall discuss this problem later.
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viduals. There must be a process of learning for the group τ1, . . . τN which
reduces I-times t1, . . . , tN to the unique I-time t.
Thus, let us consider a group τ1, . . . , τN of I-transformers with the internal
time t. The dynamics of I-states and motivations is determined by the I-
energy; H(q, p), q ∈ ZNp , p ∈ ZNp . It is natural to assume that
H(q, p) =
N∑
j=1
αjp
2
j + V (q1, . . . , qN), αj ∈ Zp.
Here Hf (p) =
∑N
j=1 αjp
2
j is the total energy of motivations for the group
τ1, . . . , τN and V (q) is the potential energy. It is natural to choose V (q) =∑
i 6=j Φ(qi−qj), where Φ(s), s ∈ Zp, is the potential of the interaction between
I-transformers.
As usual, to find a trajectory in the phase I-space ZNp × ZNp , we need to
solve the system of Hamiltonian equations:
qj =
∂H
∂pj
, pj = −∂H
∂qj
, qj(t0) = q0, pj(t0) = p0. (7)
(see [29] for such equations).
Consequences for cognitive and social sciences and psychology:
1. Energy and information. In our model a transmission of information
is determined by the I-energy which is the sum of I-energy of motivations
and potential I-energy. In principle, this process need no physical energy.
Therefore, there might be transmissions of information which could not be
reduced to transmissions of physical energy. In this case we cannot measure
physical interactions (i.e., interactions in real space-time) between two I-
transformers, τ1 and τ2 (but we could measure an information interaction).
In particular, τ1 and τ2 can be individuals participating in psychological or
social experiments (or even experiments which exhibit anomalous behaviour).
2. Distance and information. I-processes may evaluate in an I-space
which differs from the real space (absolute Newton space or a space of general
relativity). Therefore the real (”physical”) distance between I-transformers
does not play the crucial role in processes of I-interactions.
3. Time and information. Dynamics of information is dynamics with
respect to I-time t. There may be a correspondence tphys = g(t) between real
time tphys ∈ R and I-time t ∈ Zp. This correspondence may not preserve
distances.
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Let τ be an I-transformer having a continuous trajectory q(t). Small
variations of t, t′ = t + δt, imply small variations of q :
a′ = q(t′) = a + pδt, a = q(t). (8)
If (in some way) we find the internal time scale of τ, then it would be
possible to find (via (8) ) its I-state at the instant of time t′phys = g(t
′). If
t′phys > tphys then such an I-measurement can be considered as a prediction
of future events; if t′phys < tphys then we have recalling. The relation (8) gives
only unsharp information. Thus such acts of recalling and predictions may
give a lot of unfruitful information.
4. Motivation. A motion in the I-space depends, not only on the initial
I-state q0, but also on the initial motivation p0. Moreover, the Hamiltonian
structure of the equations of motion implies that the motivation p(t) plays
the important role in the process of the evolution. Thus I-dynamics is, in
fact, dynamics in phase I-space.
5. Consistency for times. An I-interaction between I-transformers is
possible only if these I-transformers have consistent I-times. Therefore every
psychological or social experiment has to contain an element of ”learning” for
I-transformers participating in the experiment. A physical interaction need
not be involved in such learning. This can be any exchange of information
between individuals (or a study of information about some individual).
6. Future and past. The consistency condition for I-times does not imply
such a condition for real times, because different I-transformers can have
different correspondence laws for I-time and real time. For example, let us
consider two I-transformers, τ1 and τ2 satisfying the consistency condition
for I-times, i.e., t1 = t2 = t. We assume that it is possible to transform
I-times of τ1 and τ2 to real times t1,phys = g1(t1) and t2,phys = g2(t2). Let
us also assume that τ1 and τ2 interact by the I-potential V (q1 − q2), i.e.,
at the instant t of I-time the potential I-energy of this interaction equals
V (q1(t)− q2(t)). If t1,phys = g1(t) 6= t2,phys = g2(t) then such an interaction is
nothing than an interaction with the future or the past.
7. Social phenomena. By our model any social group G can be described
by a system τ1, . . . , τN of coupled I-transformers. There exists an I-potential
V (q1, . . . , qN) which determines an I-interaction between members of G. For
example, democratic societies are characterized by uniform I-potentials V =∑
Φ(qi−qj). Here a contribution into the potential I-energy does not depend
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on an individual. On the other hand, hierarchic societies are characterized
by I-potentials of the form:
V = A0
∑
j 6=0
Φ(q0, qj) + A1
∑
j 6=0,1
Φ(q1, qj) + · · ·
+Ak
∑
j 6=0,...,k
Φ(qk, qj) +B
∑
i,j 6=0,...,k
Φ(qi, qj),
where |A0|p >> |A1|p >> · · · >> |Ak|p >> |B|p. These potentials describe
the hierarchy τ0 → τ1 → · · · → τk → (τk+1, . . . , τN ). The I-transformer τ0
can be a political, national or state leader or a God.
Remark 4.1. (Transformers of information and classical real fields).
If p → ∞ then the coding alphabet {0, 1, ..., p − 1} could be thought as being
continuous, i.e., it can be identified with the field of real numbers R. Therefore
information space X = Zp, p → ∞, can be identified with the infinite product of
real fields, X = R∞. Thus the I-state of an I-transformer τ can be identified with
a classical field φ(x), x ∈ R (for example via Fourier coefficients). Therefore we
can consider I-transformers as sources of classical fields (in the limit p→∞). Of
course, this is just a speculation, because we have no mathematical realization of
this limiting procedure.
4 Information velocity, acceleration, mass and
force, Newton’s law.
We have considered dynamics of I-transformers of the unit mass. There the
coefficient v of a proportion between the variation δq of the I-state and the
variation δt of I-time t: δq = vδt, was considered as a motivation. In the
general case the motivation p may not coincide with v. Let us assume that
the motivation p is proportional to v, p = mv,m ∈ Zp. This coefficient m of
proportion is called an I-mass. We also call v an I-velocity. Thus δq = p
m
δt.
Let τ1 and τ2 be two I-transformers with the I-masses m1 and m2 and
let |m1|p > |m2|p. Let τ1 and τ2 have the variations δt1, δt2 of I-time of
the same p-adic magnitude, |δt1|p = |δt2|p, and let these variations generate
the variations δq1 and δq2 of their I-states of the same p-adic magnitude,
|δq1|p = |δq2|p. To make such a change of the I-state, τ1 need a larger
motivation: |p1|p = | δqδt |p|m1|p > |p2|p = | δqδt |p|m2|p. Thus the I-mass is
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a measure of an inertia of information. We define a kinetic I-energy by
T = 1
2m
p2.
A variation δt of I-time t implies also a variation δp of the motivation p:
δp = fδt. The coefficient f of proportionality is called an I-force. Thus any
change of the motivation is due to the action of an I-force f . If f = 0 then
δp = 0 for any variation δt of t. Thus an I-transformer cannot change its
motivation in the absence of I-forces.
By analogue with the usual physics we call the coefficient a of a proportion
between the variation δv of the I-velocity v and the variation δt of the I-
time t, δv = aδt, an I-acceleration. Thus δp = amδt. This relation can be
rewritten in the form of an information analogue of the second Newton law:
ma = f (9)
or
p˙ = f. (10)
An I-force f is said to be a potential force if there exists a function V (q) such
that f = −∂V
∂q
where V is called the potential, or potential energy. The total
I-energy H is defined as the sum of the kinetic and the potential I-energies,
H(q, p) = 1
2m
p2 + V (q). The Hamiltonian equation p˙ = −∂H
∂q
coincides with
the Newton equation p˙ = f .
Example 4.1. (Hooke’s I-system). Let the I-force f be proportional to
the I-state q, f = mβ2q, where m is the I-mass and β ∈ Zp is a coefficient
of the interaction. Here (9) gives the equation q¨ = β2q. As f = −∂V
∂q
,
V (q) = −mβ2
2
q2 and H(q, p) = p
2
2m
− mβ2q2
2
; the Hamiltonian equations are
q˙ = p/m and p˙ = mβ2q. Their solutions have the form g(t) = aeβt + be−βt.
By the condition (3) the I-state q(t) and motivation p(t) are defined only for
instants of I-time which satisfy the inequality
|βt|p ≤ rp. (11)
This condition can be considered as a restriction for the magnitude of the
I-force. If the coefficient of the interaction |β|p ≤ rp, then dynamics q(t) of
the I-state is well defined for all t ∈ Zp. Larger forces imply the restriction
condition for I-time. Let |β|p = 1. If p 6= 2 then (11) has the form t ∈ U1/p(0),
i.e., t = α1p + α2p
2 + · · ·. Thus the I-state q(t) of the I-transformer τ can
be defined (observed) only for the instants of time t0 = 0, t1 = p, ..., tp−1 =
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(p − 1)p, ... . If p = 2 then (11) has the form t ∈ U1/4(0), i.e., and t =
α22
2 + α32
3 + · · ·. Thus the I-state q(t) of τ can be defined (observed) only
for the instants of time t0 = 0, t1 = 4, t2 = 8, ... .
Let f = −mβ2q, i.e., V (q) = mβ2q2
2
and q¨ = −β2q. Here q(t) and p(t) have
the form g(t) = a cos βt+ b sin βt. Here we also have the restriction relation
(11). As opposite to the real case the p-adic trigonometric functions are not
periodical. There is no analogue of oscillations for the I-process described
by an analogue of Hooke’s law.
Let us consider the solution of the Hamiltonian equations with the initial
conditions q(0) = 0 and p(0) = mβ: q(t) = sin βt, p(t) = mβ cos βt. We
have qp = (mβ/2) sin 2βt. By using the p-adic equality | sin a|p = |a|p we get
|qp|p = |mβ|p|βt|p. The relation (11) implies
|q|p|p|p ≤ |mβ|prp. (12)
This is a restriction relation for the trajectory (q(t), p(t)) in the phase I-
space (compare with [33]). Let β = 1/m. Then (12) gives |q|p|p|p ≤ rp.
If the motivation p is strong |p|p = 1, then q can be only of the form q =
α1p + α2p
2 + · · ·, p 6= 2 and q = α222 + α323 + · · ·, p = 2. If the motivation
p is rather weak then the I-state q of an I-transformer can be arbitrary.
The restriction relation (12) is natural if we apply our information model
to describe psychological (social) behaviour of individuals. Strong psycho-
logical (social) motivations imply some restrictions for possible psychological
(social) states q. On the other hand, if motivations are rather weak an indi-
vidual can, in principle, arrive to any psychological (social) state.
We discuss the role of the I-mass in the restriction relation (12). There
the decrease of the I-mass implies more rigid restrictions for the possible
I-states (for the fixed magnitude of the motivation). If we return to the
psychological (social) applications we get that the individual (or a group of
individuals) with a small magnitude of I-mass and the strong motivations
will have quite restricted set of I-states.
The restriction relation (12) is an analogue of the Heisenberg uncertainty
relations in the ordinary quantum mechanics. However, we consider a clas-
sical (i.e., not quantized) I-system. Therefore a classical I-system can have
behaviour that is similar to quantum behaviour.
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5 Mathematical ”pathologies” in the formal-
ism of the information mechanics and their
interpretations
In p-adic analysis the condition f ≡ 0 does not imply that a differentiable
function f is a constant, see [21], [46]. Therefore, there exist very complicated
continuous motions (q(t), p(t)) in the I-phase space for I-transformers with
zero I-energy (q˙ ≡ 0 or p˙ ≡ 0).
In psychological models these motions can be interpreted as motions with-
out any motivation. Such motions need no information force. On the other
hand, we can consider an I-potential V (q) such that ∂V
∂q
= 0. Here the po-
tential I-energy V (q) can have very complicated behaviour on the I-space
X = Zp. At the same time the I-force f = 0. Thus there may exist I-fields
which do not induce any I-force.
All mathematical pathologies can be eliminated by the consideration of
analytical functions. If f ≡ 0 and f is analytic then f = constant.
In psychological models we can interpret analytical trajectories in the
phase I-space as a ”normal behaviour”, i.e., an individual need a motivation
for the change of a psychological state. Here we can observe some psycholog-
ical (information) force which induces this change. There is a psychological
(information) field which generates this force. The model puts trajectories
(non-analytical) with zero motivation in relation with abnormal psychological
behaviour, mental diseases and anomalous phenomena. Here an individual
changes his psychological state without any motivation in the absence of any
information force. Here, in fact, a p-adic generalization of the Hamiltonian
formalism does not work. We need to propose a new physical formalism to
describe such phenomena.
Not all unusual properties of p-adic quantities are connected with non-
analyticity. For example, in p-adic analysis we can construct polynomials
of the form V (x) = α0 + α1x + · · · + αNxN , where the coefficients αj are
natural numbers, |αj|p = 1, such that ǫ = supx∈Zp |V (x)|p can be arbitrary
small (see [46]). Therefore the result of the simultaneous action of quite
strong I-potentials Vj(x) = αjx
j , j = 0, 1, ..., N, can have arbitrary small
magnitude.
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6 Information work, conservation laws
To eliminate from our consideration all ”pathological” motions in the I-
space, we shall consider only I-quantities described by analytical functions.
Of course, we do not claim that only analytical functions describe real infor-
mation processes. We like only to simplify mathematical considerations.
Let f(x) =
∑∞
n=0 anx
n, an ∈ Qp, and let the series converge for |x|p ≤ δ,
δ = p±n, n = 0, 1, . . .. We define an integral of f by the formula (see [26]):
∫ b
a
f(x) dx =
∞∑
n=0
an
n+ 1
[an+1 − bn+1].
The series on the right-hand side converges for all |a|p, |b|p ≤ δp . In particular,
we can find an antiderivative F of f by the formula F (x) =
∫ x
0 f(x) dx.
Let f be an I-force which is described by the function f(x) which is
analytic for |x|p ≤ p. Then this force is potential with the I-potential V (x) =∫ x
0 f(x) dx.
Let γ = {q(t), |t|p ≤ λ} be an analytic curve in Zp. We define its length
element by ds = vdt, where v = q˙ is the I-velocity. By definition
Wab =
∫
γ(a,b)
f ds =
∫ t1
t0
f(q(t))v(t) dt
where q(t0) = a and q(t1) = b. The quantity Wab is said to be the work done
by the external I-force f upon the I-transformer in going from the point a
to the point b. By (10) we have
Wab =
∫ t1
t0
mv˙v dt =
m
2
∫ t1
t0
d
dt
v2 dt =
1
2m
(p2(b)− p2(a)).
Thus the work done is equal to the change in the kinetic energy: Wab =
Tb− Ta. As the I-force f is potential then the work W done around a closed
orbit is zero: W =
∮
f ds = 0. Thus the work Wab does not depend on an
analytic trajectory γ(a, b).
We also have:
Wab =
∫
γ(a,b)
−∂V
∂q
ds =
∫
γ(a,b)
− d
dt
V (q(t)) dt = V (a)− V (b).
Thus Tb−Ta = V (a)−V (b). We have obtained the energy conservation law for
an I-transformer: if the I-forces acting on an I-transformer are described by
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analytical functions (in particular, they are potential), then the total energy
of the I-transformer, H = T + V , is conserved.
At the moment the situation with nonanalytic potential I-forces is not
clear. It may be that the energy conservation law is violated in the general
case.
7 Mechanics of a system of information trans-
formers, constraints on information spaces
Let τ1, . . . , τN be a system of I-transformers with I-masses, m1, . . . , mN ∈ Zp.
As in ordinary mechanics we must distinguish between the external I-forces
F
(e)
i acting on I-transformers due to sources outside the system and internal
forces Fji. As we have already discussed, I-times t1, . . . , tN of τ1, . . . , τN must
satisfy the consistency condition:
t1 = t2 = · · · = tN = t. (13)
Thus the equation of motion for the ith particle is to be written:
p˙i = F
(e)
i +
∑
j
Fji. (14)
For some I-systems we may obey an information analogue of Newton’s third
law (a law of information action and reaction): Fij = −Fji.
Set x =
∑
imixi/M , where M =
∑
mi. This point in the I-space is
said to be the center of information of the system. If the system satisfies
Newton’s third law for I-forces then we get the equation of motion: Mx¨ =∑
i F
(e)
i = F
(e). The center of information moves as if the total external I-
force was acting on the I-mass M of the system concentrated at the center
of information. We introduce the motivation P = Mx˙ of the I-system.
There is the following conservation theorem for motions described by analytic
functions (qj(t))
N
j=1, t ∈ Zp: if the total external I-force is zero, the total
motivation of the I-system is conserved.
Example 7.1. (Social systems). We apply our I-model for describing a
society S which consists of individuals (or groups of individuals) τ1, . . . , τN .
There exist the center of information of S, xS ∈ Zp which can be considered
as a coding sequence for this society. If S satisfies Newton’s law of action-
reaction for I-forces then its evolution is determined by the external I-forces.
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If this evolution is not ”pathological” then the motivation of S is conserved.
Of course, there might be numerous ”pathological” evolutions (for example,
evolutions with zero motivation, PS = 0).
For analytic motions the I-work done by all I-forces in moving the system
from an initial configuration A = {ai = qi(t0)} to a final configuration B =
{bi = qi(t1)} is well defined:
Wab =
∑
i
∫
γ(ai,bi)
Fi dsi +
∑
i 6=j
∫
γ(a,b)
Fji dsi
and Wab = TB−TA, where T = 12
∑
imiv
2
i is the total kinetic I-energy of the
I-system. As usual T = 1
2
Mv2 + 1
2
∑
imiv
′2
i where v is the velocity of the
center of information and v′i is the velocity of τi with respect to the center of
information.
In our model of ‘social motion’ (Example 7.1) we can say that the total
kinetic energy of the society S is the sum of the kinetic energy of the center
of information of S and the kinetic energy of motions of individuals τj about
the center of information.
We now consider the case when all I-forces are (analytical) potential:
F
(e)
i = −∂Vi∂xi and Fji = −
∂Vij
∂xi
. To satisfy the law of action and reaction we can
choose Vij = Φij(xi − xj) where Φij : Zp → Zp,Φij = Φji are analytical func-
tions. Then by repeating the considerations of the standard mechanics over
the reals we obtain that WAB = −V (B)+V (A), where V = ∑i Vi+ 12
∑
i,j Vij
is the total potential energy of the system of I-transformers. Therefore the
total I-energy H = T+V is conserved for every I-system with (analytical) po-
tential I-forces (such that Fij satisfy the law of information action-reaction).
The consideration of I-systems induces dynamics in multidimensional I-
spaces; XN = Z
N
p . Such spaces can be useful for the description, not only
systems of I-transformers, but also individual I-transformers which have
multidimensional information spaces.
For example, let τ be a cognitive system and let x = (x1, . . . , xN), xj ∈
Zp, be a set of ideas with which operates τ (i.e., there are N parallel thinking
processes π1, ..., πN in τ , see [18] - [20] for the details). Then the I-dynamics
for τ is described by the trajectory (q(t), p(t)) ∈ Z2Np .
As in standard mechanics, constraints play the important role in I-mechanics.
The simplest constraints (”holonomic”) can be expressed as equations con-
necting I-states of I-transformers τ1, . . . , τN (or equations coupling different
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ideas in the cognitive system):
f(q1, . . . , qN , t) = 0.
Here f may be a function from ZN+1p into Zp or a function from Z
N+1
p into
R. The simplest constraints of the ”real type” are:
(C1) |q1 − a|p = r, . . . , |qN − a|p = r, r > 0, a ∈ Zp, i.e., all I-transformers
have to move over the surface of the sphere Sr(a);
(C2) |q2 − q1| = r, . . . , |qN − q1| = r, i.e., there is the fixed I-transformer τ1
such that all other I-transformers must move on the distance r from τ1;
(C3) We can also consider an ”information rigid body”, i.e., a system of
I-transformers connected by constraints: |qi − qj |p = rij.
Example 7.2. (Restricted mentality). In cognitive sciences constraint
(C1) can be used for the description of a ”restricted mentality”. All ideas
q1(t), ..., qN(t) of a cognitive system τ (generated by the parallel processes
π1, ..., πN) belong to the restricted domain of ideas X = Sr(a).
Example 7.3. (Ideology, religion). Let us consider the I-model of a
society S with an ideology (or religion) a ∈ Zp. Then constraint (C1) can
be interpreted as describing a social layer L = (τ1, ..., τN) of S. These are
all individuals who accept the ideology (or religion) a with an ”information
precision” r. Let this precision r = 1/pk and let qj(t) = (qjα(t))
∞
α=0, a =
(aα)
∞
α=0. The constraint (C1) implies that
qj0(t) = a0, ..., qjk−1(t) = ak−1, but qjk(t) 6= ak.
The members of L accept dogmas a0, ..., ak−1 of the ideology (or religion),
but they deny the dogma ak. In our hierarchical model all other dogmas do
not play any role. If the dogma ak is violated then the violation of ak+j would
not change a status of τj.
Example 7.4. (Evolution of an idea-fix). Let us consider a cognitive
system τ with N parallel thinking processes π1, ..., πN . The constraint (C2)
means that there is a thinking process in the cognitive system (in our case this
is π1) which has a strong influence on all other thinking processes πj, j 6= 1.
They could not go far away from π1. In psychology π1 may be interpreted
as a process of evolution of an idea-fix. The constraint (C2) in the I-space
of the cognitive system τ implies that all thinking activity of τ is connected
with this idea-fix.
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Example 7.5. (Kingdoms, families and lovers). The constraint (C2) can
be interpreted as describing a social layer L = (τ2, ..., τN) in a kingdom K
with the king τ1. The evolution q1(t) of the I-state of the king induces the
information restrictions (C2) for evolutions of I-states of members of the layer
L. The same constraint may be used for an information model of evolution
of a family F. Here τ1 may be the father or mother. In the case N = 2 we
obtain the symmetric model which may be used for the description of a pair
of lovers. Similar constraints in the I-space might explain some anomalous
information connections between individuals.
Example 7.6. (Scandinavian society). The constraint (C3) may be used
in social sciences for the description of ”Scandinavian societies”. There are
nonzero distances rij > 0, i, j = 1, ..., N, between individuals in the I-space.
These distances are stable in the process of time evolution.
In the case of holonomic constraints described by the system of analytical
functions: fj : Z
N+1
p → Zp, j = 1, . . . , K, i.e., fj(q1, . . . , qN , t) = 0, we
can use the technique of the standard mechanics 7. If the equations are
independent then we can introduce generalized I-coordinates ξ1, . . . , ξN−K ,
and ql = ql(ξ1, . . . , ξN−K , t) l = 1, . . . , N , and ql(ξ, t) are analytical functions
of ξ and t (see [21], [46] for the mathematical details).
Example 7.7. (Hidden basic ideas). If q(t) = (ql(t))
N
l=1 describes ideas in
the cognitive system at the instant t of I-time, then by resolving constraints
on these ideas we can find ”independent ideas” ξ(t) = (ξj(t))
N−K
j=1 which, in
fact, determine the I-state of the cognitive system.
Example 7.8. (Hidden leaders). If q(t) = (ql(t))
N
l=1 describes the sys-
tem S = (τ1, . . . , τN) of I-transformers then the existence of generalized
I-coordinates ξ can be interpreted as a possibility to reduce I-behaviour of
S to I-behaviour of the other system G = (g1, . . . , gN−K) of I-transformers.
As in the standard mechanics, we introduce general I-forces:
Qj =
∑
i
Fi
∂qi
∂ξj
, (15)
where Fi is the total I-force acting to ith I-transformer (i.e., Fi = F
(a)
i + fi
7These methods may not be applied to constraints determined by real valued functions.
However, in the latter case we need not eliminate these constraints. These constraints
describe open subsets of the configuration I-space ZNp . We can choose such subsets as
new configuration I-spaces.
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is the sum of applied I-force F
(a)
i and the I-force fi of constraints
8).
In our theory generalized I-forces have the natural interpretation (com-
pare with the situation with generalized forces in the usual mechanics). As
we have noted, the existence of generalized I-coordinates which are obtained
from equations for constraints means that the initial system S = (τ1, . . . , τN)
of I-transformers is ”controlled” by the other system G = (g1, . . . , gN−K)
of I-transformers. The I-forces (15) are, in fact, reaction I-forces, i.e., the
control of G over S generates I-forces applied to elements of G. By repeating
of the usual computations we get the equations of motion:
d
dt
(
∂T
∂ξ˙j
)− ∂T
∂ξj
= Qj , j = 1, . . . , N −K. (16)
If the I-forces Fi are potential with the analytical potential V , i.e., Fi = −∂V∂qi ,
then generalized I-forces are also potential: Qj = − ∂V∂ξj . In this case the above
equation can be written in the form:
d
dt
(
∂L
∂ξ˙j
)− ∂L
∂ξj
= 0, (17)
where L = T − V is the I-Lagrangian.
It is important that the equations (17) can be used to describe I-motions
in the presence of an I-potential V (q, q˙) which depends on (generalized) I-
velocities vi = q˙i. In this case
Qj = −∂V
∂qj
+
d
dt
(
∂V
∂q˙j
) (18)
and L = T − V .
These velocity-dependent potentials may play an important role in I-
processes. In particular, there might have applications in such an exotic field
as anomalous phenomena. It is claimed (see, for example, [12] - [17]) that
a psychokinesis effect can be observed for some random physical processes
and it cannot be observed for deterministic processes. It might be tempting
to explain this phenomenon on the basis of the assumption that an I-field
generated in experiments on the psychokinesis corresponds to a potential
which depends on the I-velocity (thus the corresponding I-force is defined
by (18) ). The I-velocity is higher for random processes. Therefore the
interaction is stronger for these processes.
8We can interpret I-constraints as unknown I-forces.
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8 Quantum mechanics on information spaces
It is quite natural to quantize classical mechanics on information spaces over
Zp. We give the following reasons for such quantization. Observations over I-
quantities are statistical observations. We have to study statistical ensembles
of I-transformers (instead studying of an individual I-transformer). Such
statistical ensembles are described by quantum states φ. As usual in quantum
formalism, we can assume that a value λ of an I-quantity A can be measured
in the state φ with some probability Pφ(A = λ). This ideology is nothing
than the application of the statistical (ensemble) interpretation of quantum
mechanics (see, for example, [44] or [6]) to the information theory. By this
interpretation any measurement process has two steps: (1) a preparation
procedure E ; (2) a measurement of a quantity B in the states φ which were
prepared with the aid of E .
Let us consider these steps in the information framework. By E we have
to select a statistical ensemble φ of I-transformers on the basis of some I-
characteristics. Typically in quantum physics a preparation procedure E is
realized as a filter based on some physical quantity A, i.e., we select elements
which satisfy the condition A = µ where µ is one of the values of A. We can
do the same in quantum I-theory. An I-quantity A is chosen as a filter, i.e., I-
transformers for the statistical ensemble φ are selected by the condition A = µ
where µ ∈ Zp is some information. For example, we can choose A = p, the
motivation, and select a statistical ensemble φ = φ(p = µ) of I-transformers
which have the same motivation µ ∈ Zp. Then we realize the second step of a
measurement process and measure some information quantity B in the state
φ(p=µ). For example, we can measure the I-state q of I-transformers belonging
to the statistical ensemble described by φ(p=µ). We shall obtain a probability
distribution P(q = λ|p = µ), λ, µ ∈ Zp (a probability that I-transformer
has the I-state q = λ under the condition that it has the motivation p = µ).
It is also possible to measure the I-energy E of I-transformers. We shall
obtain a probability distribution P(E = λ|p = µ), λ, µ ∈ Zp9. On the other
hand, we can prepare a statistical ensemble φ(q=µ) by fixing some information
9 We now try to provide theoretical foundations for quantum I-theory. We do not
discuss concrete measurement procedures for I-quantities. In particular, at the moment it
is not clear how the I-energy can be measured. It seems natural to use an analogue with
usual quantum theory here. The I-energy can be measured in the process of interactions
between I-transformers or interactions of I-transformers and I-fields.
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µ ∈ Zp and selecting all I-transformers which have the I-state q = µ. Then
we can measure motivations of these I-transformers and we shall obtain a
probability distribution P(p = λ|q = µ).
Other possibility is to use a generalization of the individual interpretation
of quantum mechanics. By this interpretation a wave function ψ(x), x ∈ Rn,
describes the state of an individual quantum particle. In the same way we
may assume that a wave function ψ(x), x ∈ Znp , on the I-space describes the
state of an individual I-transformer τ.
Example 8.1. (Referendum). In some social models we can consider
individuals as quantum I-transformers. A referendum is one of the possible
measurement devices. Here the act of a measurement is a procedure of giving
answers to questions of the referendum. By the individual interpretation
individuals have no definite answers to these questions before the referendum.
These answers (information communications) are created in the process of
the referendum. In fact, this I-measurement changes I-states of individuals.
Example 8.2. (Conscious measurement of quantum subconsciousness)
We might describe brain’s functioning by the following quantum I-model.
There is a quantum system, subconsciousness10, which state is described by
the wave function ψ(x), x ∈ Zp. There is a measurement device, conscious-
ness, which measures the I-state q of the subconsciousness. The concrete
value (idea) of q is not determined before the act of the conscious measure-
ment. It is created only at the instant of a measurement. Of course, this act
of a measurement (as in the ordinary quantum mechanics) changes the state
of the subconsciousness. The main difference from the standard quantum me-
chanical scheme is that we consider repeatable measurements over the same
quantum system. In ordinary scheme of a quantum measurement we con-
sider an ensemble of identical systems. At the moment we can present only
some speculations about nature of the consciousness. The consciousness is
an information field generated by the brain. This field interacts continuously
with the subconsciousness11 .
10By our model [18] the subconsciousness is a kind of processor in that work a large
number of dynamical systems of the form xn = f(xn−1), where f : Zp → Zp is a continuous
function. Attractors of these dynamical systems are solutions of problems.
11This is a feedback process [18]: the conscious field sends to the subconsciousness a
problem x0 which is the initial condition for one of dynamical systems located in the
subconsciousness (this is the signal to start the work of the dynamical system). On the
other hand, an attractor of this dynamical system (a solution of the problem x0) interacts
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Example 8.3. ( Psychoanalysis). On the basis of the model of the pre-
vious example we can interpret psychoanalysis as a series of measurements
of the I-state of the subconsciousness. These measurements continuously
change the wave function of the subconsciousness. Thus psychoanalysis is a
treatment based on the series of quantum I-measurements. In fact, psycho-
analytic tries to provide some functions of the conscious field.12.
The problem of interpretations is an important problem of ordinary quan-
tum mechanics on real space. The same problem arises immediately in our
quantum I-theory. We do not like to start our investigation with a hard dis-
cussion on the right interpretation. We can be quite pragmatic and use both
interpretations by our convenience. However, the reader, who is interested
in foundations of quantum mechanics, can find the extended discussion on
the problem of the interpretation in Appendix 2.
In fact, a mathematical model for quantum I-formalism has been already
constructed. This is quantum mechanics with p-adic valued functions, see
[29], [18], [37], [34], [35]. We present briefly this model. The space of quantum
states is realized as a p-adic Hilbert space K (see [29], [18] about the theory
of such spaces). This is a Qp-linear space which is a Banach space (with the
norm ‖ ·‖) and on which is defined a symmetric bilinear form (·, ·) : K×K →
Qp. This form is called an inner product on K. It is assumed that the norm
and the inner product are connected by the Cauchy-Bunaykovski-Schwarz
inequality: |(x, y)|p ≤ ‖x‖‖y‖, x, y ∈ K.
Remark 8.1 It is possible to use more general spaces over different ex-
tensions of Qp (analogues of complex Hilbert spaces).
By definition quantum I-state φ is an element of K such that (φ, φ) = 1;
quantum I-quantity A is a symmetric bounded operator A : K → K, i.e.,
with the conscious field (this is the signal to stop the work of the dynamical system).
12Thus Freud’s theory [47] may be interpreted in the following way. If the interaction
between the consciousness and subconsciousness is not sufficiently strong, the conscious-
ness ”cannot see” some attractors of dynamical systems located in the subconsciousness.
Thus the consciousness cannot send to the subconsciousness the signal to stop iterations
of these dynamical systems. These dynamical systems are continuously busy and they
cannot be used for other purposes. Other possibility is that the general interaction is
strong. However, the consciousness ”cannot recognize” some attractor as a solution of a
problem because a strong external information field (a taboo) might hinder to the interac-
tion. Therefore a psychoanalytic has to find the hidden attractor and by this act the work
of the corresponding dynamical system will be stoped. Of course, he must be isolated
from the corresponding ”taboo-field”.
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(Ax, y) = (x,Ay), x, y ∈ K13. We discuss a statistical interpretation of
quantum states in the case of a discrete spectrum of A.
Let {λ1, . . . , λn, . . .}, λj ∈ Zp be eigenvalues of A, Aφn = λnφn, φn ∈
K, (φn, φn) = 1. The eigenstates φn of A are considered as pure quantum
I-states for A, i.e., if the system of I-transformers is described by the state
φn then the I-quantity A has the value λn ∈ Zp with probability 1. Let us
consider a mixed state
φ =
∞∑
n=1
qnφn, qn ∈ Qp, (19)
where (φ, φ) =
∑∞
n=1 q
2
n = 1
14. By the statistical interpretation of φ if we
realize a measurement of the I-quantity A for I-transformers belonging to
the statistical ensemble described by φ then we obtain the value λn with
probability P (A = λn|φ) = q2n.
The main problem (or the advantage?) of this quantum model is that
these probabilities belong to the field of p-adic numbersQp. The simplest way
is to eliminate this problem by considering only finite mixtures (19) for which
qn ∈ Qp (the field of rational numbers Q is a subfield of Qp). In this case the
quantities P(A = λn|φ) = q2n can be interpreted as usual probabilities (for
example, in the framework of Kolmogorov’s theory [48]). Therefore we may
assume that there exist (can be prepared) quantum I-states φ which have the
standard statistical interpretation: when the number N of experiments tends
to infinity, the frequency νN(A = λn|φ) of an observation of the information
λn ∈ Zp tends to the probability q2n.
However, we can use a more general viewpoint to this problem. In book
[29] a (non-Kolmogorov) probability model with p-adic probabilities has been
developed. If we use a p-adic generalization of a frequency approach to
probability (see R. von Mises, [49]), then p-adic probabilities are defined as
limits of relative frequencies νN with respect to the p-adic topology
15. The
13In p-adic models we do not need to consider unbounded operators, because all quantum
quantities can be realized by bounded operators, see [29], [18], [37], [34], [35].
14As in the usual theory of Hilbert spaces, eigenvectors corresponding to different eigen-
values of a symmetric operator are orthogonal.
15It is quite surprising that in the p-adic framework we can obtain negative rational fre-
quency probabilities [29], [50]. On the other hand, negative ‘probabilities’ appear in quite
natural way in many quantum models (see, for example, [51]- [53]). P.A.M. Dirac was the
first to introduce explicitly the concept of negative probability (in close connection with
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relative frequencies νN ∈ Q and they can be considered, not only as elements
of R, R ⊂ Q, but also as elements of Qp, Qp ⊂ Q.
By using the p-adic frequency probability model for the statistical in-
terpretation of quantum I-states we may assume that there exists I-states φ
(ensembles of I-transformers) such that the relative frequencies νN(A = λn|φ)
have no limit in R, i.e., we cannot apply the standard law of the large num-
bers in this situation. Hence if we realize measurements of an I-quantity
A for such a quantum I-state and study the observed data by using the
standard statistical methods (based on real analysis), then we shall not ob-
tain the definite result. There will be only random fluctuations of relative
frequencies, see [29], [50] .
Remark 8.2. Such a behaviour can be related to psychological exper-
iments. Here the possibility of the use of p-adic probability models gives
the important consequence for scientists doing experiments with a statistical
I-data: the absence of the statistical stabilization (random fluctuation) does
not imply the absence of an I-phenomenon. This statistical behaviour may
have the meaning that this I-phenomenon cannot be described by the standard
Kolmogorov probability model.
We now discuss other interesting implications of p-adic probability theory.
There exists statistical samples [29], [50] in which the frequencies νN → 0,
in the standard real topology, but νN → α 6= 0 in Qp. In this case the usual
(Mises) frequency probability P(A = λ|φ) = 0. This implies that we have
to consider the event {A = λ|φ} (an observation of the information λ) as
nonphysical event. However, from the point of view of the p-adic probability
theory this is the physical event (of course, in the sense of I-physics).
The evolution of a p-adic wave function is described by an I-analogue of
the concept of negative energy), [51]. R. Feynman also discussed the possibility to use
negative probabilities in quantum formalism, see [52]. In particular, he remarked: ”The
only difference between a probabilistic classical world and the equations of the quantum
world is that somehow or other it appears as if the probabilities would have to go nega-
tive, and that we do not know, as far as I know, how to simulate”. These probabilities
were used to explain violations of Bell’s inequality (see review [53]). Here the assumption
that a distribution of hidden variables may be a signed ‘probabilistic measure’ implies
existence of numerous models with hidden variables in that Bell’s inequality is violated.
Wiegner’s distribution on the phase space gives other example of signed quantum ‘proba-
bilistic’ distribution. In works [38] - [40], [54], [55] the p-adic probabilities (which are well
defined on the mathematical level of rigorousness) were used to justify the use of negative
probabilities in quantum theories.
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the Schro¨dinger equation:
hp
i
∂ψ
∂t
(t, x) =
h2p
2m
∂2ψ
∂x2
(t, x)− V (t, x)ψ(t, x), (20)
where m is the I-mass of a quantum I-transformer. Here a constant hp plays
the role of the Planck constant. By pure mathematical reasons (related to
convergence of p-adic exponential and trigonometric series) it is convenient
to choose hp =
1
p
.
We may also present some physical arguments for such a choice. In or-
dinary quantum mechanics the Planck constant is related to the measure of
discretization. The constant hp =
1
p
is related to the level of discretization of
information.
If we use the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics then the
parameter t plays the role of common I-time for elements of a statistical
ensemble of I-transformers described by the wave function. Therefore, to be
able to describe the evolution of a quantum state ψ, we must have consistent
I-times for elements of this statistical ensemble.
We use the factor i =
√−1 in (20), because we like to have the total
coincidence with formulas of the ordinary quantum mechanics. As we have
already noted, in the p-adic case the functions eiαx and eαx have the same
(non-oscillating) behaviour. Therefore, in principle, we can use the analogue
of (20) in that the factor i is omitted.
The use of i implies the consideration of the extension Qp(i) = Qp ×
iQp of Qp. Elements of this extension have the form z = a + ib, a, b ∈ Qp.
This extension is well defined for p = 3,mod 4. As usual, we introduce a
congugation z = a− ib; here we have zz = a2+b2. In what follows we assume
that wave functions take values in Zp(i) = Zp × iZp.
Example 8.4. ( A free I-transformer). Let the potential V = 0. Then the
solution of the Schro¨dinger equation corresponding to the I-energy E = p
2
2m
has the form16 :
ψp(t, x) = e
i(px−Et)/hp . (21)
By the choice hp = 1/p this function is well defined for all x ∈ Zp and t ∈ Zp.
As ψψ ≡ 1, this wave function describes the uniform (p-adic probability)
16We note that formal expressions for analytical solutions of p-adic differential equations
coincide with the corresponding expressions in the real case (in fact, we can consider these
equations over arbitrary number field, see [29]). However, behaviours of these solutions
are different.
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distribution, see [29], on the ring of p-adic integers Zp. Thus an I-transformer
τ in the state ψ can be observed with equal probability in any state x ∈ Zp.
In this sense behaviour of a free I-transformer is similar to behaviour of the
ordinary free quantum particle. On the other hand, there is no analogue of
oscillations: ψp(t, x) = cos(px− Et)/hp + i sin(px− Et)/hp, and | cos(px−
Et)/hp|p = 1, | sin(px−Et)/hp|p = |(px− Et)/hp|p.
Remark 8.4. Is it possible to reproduce oscillations with respect to
ordinary real time on the basis of the information model? It could be done
by a time scaling. Let f : Zp → Zp be an arbitrary continuous function.
Then f(t + kpn) ≈ f(t) for all k ∈ Z for sufficiently large n (uniformly for
t ∈ Zp). Let tphys = g(t) be a law of the correspondence between I-time
t ∈ Zp and real time tphys ∈ R. If 2π = g(pn) then the p-adic continuity will
imply the periodicity in real time. Therefore, the ordinary wave behaviour is
nothing other than a consequence of continuity of information flows and the
appropriative choice of a time scale. Depending on a time scale an I-process
may or may not exhibit wave behaviour in the real picture of reality.
We consider a psychological (and social) consequence of Example 8.4: in
the absence of the external potential the same motivation p may imply any
I-state x ∈ Zp.
Let us consider mixtures of states of the form (21). We set t = 0. Let
ψ(x) = a1ψp1 + a2ψp2 , a1, a2 ∈ Zp.
If we compute < ψ, ψ >=
∫
Zp
ψ(x)ψ(x)dx (where dx is a uniform p-adic
valued distribution on Zp) we see a large difference with ordinary quantum
mechanics: < ψ, ψ > 6= a1a¯1 + a2a¯2. There is nonzero correlation term. For
α = (p1 − p2)/hp, we have [18]:
T (α) =< ψp1 , ψp2 > + < ψp2 , ψp1 >=
α sinα
1− cosα.
Thus there are correlations between the motivations p1 and p2 in the state
ψ. By using the individual interpretation of quantum mechanics we say that
an I-transformer τ with the wave function ψ is in the superposition of two
motivations p1 and p2. Moreover, these motivations could not be measured
exactly (compare with [18], [33]).
Such a situation is natural for psychological and social phenomena. In
fact, a psychological or social motivation may be not represented in the
brain in the definite form before the act of a measurement (at least for some
quantum information states). Moreover, it cannot be measured exactly. Such
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information measurements may be used as illustrations of the process of a
measurement in ordinary quantum mechanics. By analogy we can say that
the definite value of a physical observable is created in a long process of the
interaction with an equipment. Moreover, it can be never measured exactly
(compare with [56] - [57]).
Example 8.5. (Quantum Hooke’s system) To give an example of a
Hamiltonian with discrete spectrum, we consider the formal p-adic general-
ization of the Hamiltonian of a harmonic oscillator:
Hˆ = − h
2
p
2m
d2
dx2
− 1
2
mω2x2 − 1
2
,
where m is the I-mass. We consider ω simply as the coefficient of interaction
(there is no analogue of harmonic oscillations). The operator Hˆ has eigen-
values En = hpωn, n = 0, 1, ... (see [18]). However, in the p-adic case the
difference between continuous and discrete spectra is not so strong (for each
En, we have En = limk→∞Elk , lk 6= n). On the other hand, discreetness of a
spectrum, of course, induces some restrictions on values (information) which
can be observed.
9 Appendix 1: Models of reality and number
systems
Since Newton’s time, we use a model of physical reality based on a description of all
physical processes by real numbers. In fact, the use of real numbers is equivalent to
the assumption that any physical quantity can be measured (at least in principle)
with an infinite precision. We shall discuss this point more carefully.
To realize a measurement of a physical quantity x, first we have to fix a unit of
a measurement l = 1. We assume that there exists such a natural number n that
(n− 1)l ≤ x < nl. (22)
This assumption is a mathematical postulate, the Archimedean axiom. There-
fore by (22) we restrict our considerations to physical phenomena which can be
described on the basis of the Archimedean mathematical model.
We now consider the next step of the measurement process. If y1 = (n −
1)l 6= x then we have to measure the quantity x1 = x − y1 by using a smaller
unit of the measurement. Typically we fix a natural number m > 1 ( the scale
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of the measurement) and choose the new unit l1 = l/m. Then we apply the
Archimedean axiom (22) to the quantities x1 and l1 and obtain a natural number
β1 (β1 = 1, . . . ,m)): (β1 − 1)l1 ≤ x1 < β1l1. This procedure can be continued. If
y2 = (β1 − 1)l1 6= x1 then we can use the new unit of measurement l2 = l1/m to
measure the quantity x2 = x1 − y2 and so on. We remark that
x = (n− 1) + x1 = (n− 1) + α−1
m
+ x2 = n− 1 + α−1
m
+ · · ·+ α−n
mn
+ xn+1, (23)
where α−k = βk− 1 = 0, 1, . . . ,m− 1. To obtain the real numbers model for phys-
ical reality, we assume that the above process of measurements of every physical
quantity x can be continued by an infinite number of steps. We call this postulate
the postulate of an infinite precision of measurements or the Newton axiom. By
this axiom any physical quantity x can be identified with the real number:
x = · · ·+α−n
mn
+· · ·+α−1
m
+α0+α1m+· · ·+αkmk = αk · · ·α0, α−1 · · ·α−n · · · , (24)
where α±j = 0, 1, . . . ,m− 1, (here the number (n − 1), see (23), is also expanded
with respect to powers of m).
Both the Archimedean and Newton axioms are natural for the description of
an extended class of physical phenomena. The basis of the Archimedean-Newton
model of reality is Newton’s space which is continuous, infinitely divisible and
infinitely deep. All physical objects are located in this space and their location
can be determined (at least in principle) with an infinite precision.
It would be natural to develop other models of physical reality which are not
based on the Archimedean and Newton axioms.
The quantum formalism is one of successful attempts to give a new model of
physical reality. The Archimedean and Newton axioms cannot be applied to quan-
tum observables. However, quantum theory uses the old mathematical basis, real
numbers. Of course, such a situation when non-Archimedean and non-Newtonean
phenomena are considered in ”real” reality should induce paradoxes. One of such
paradoxes is the EPR paradox which gives the right consequence, the death of
reality (see, for example, [6],[7] for the details).
In the present paper we started to develop a new model of reality, information
reality, based on systems of m-adic numbers. This is a non-Archimedean model.
Here we could not ‘compare’ two arbitrary information quantities x, y ∈ Zm. This
is a non-Newtonian model. Information could not be ‘measured with an infinite
precision.’ Information spaces are discrete. There always exists a ‘minimal space
length’, a bit of information17
17Our model of reality is closely connected with physical theories based on the funda-
mental length formalism or discrete space-time, see, for example [59]-[61].
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10 Appendix 2. An interpretation of quan-
tum information mechanics.
We shall discuss the problem of interpretation on the basis of an example of a
cognitive quantum system. Our analysis of measurement processes for quantum
cognitive systems implies that we have to use the ensemble interpretation. There
are two main viewpoints on the ensemble interpretation. The first is based on
realism (see, for example, [44]). Here every physical quantity A pertaining to
a quantum state φ which describes a statistical ensemble S has some definite
value for each s ∈ S. The second is based on empiricism. Here it is not assumed
the ”objective existence” of definite values of A. The φ gives only probabilities
that A would take some values (if a measurement of A is performed). In fact,
in conventional quantum mechanics the ensemble interpretation is based on the
stronger form of empiricism: it could not be assumed that A has definite ”objective
value” a for each s ∈ S. Our analysis implies rather strange consequences. On the
one hand, we understood that it is impossible to interpret a quantum state φ on
the basis of pure realism. On the other hand, we could not follow the conventional
ensemble interpretation. On the one hand, a preparation procedure Eb which can
be realized as a filter with respect to values {bj} of an I-quantity B produces a
statistical ensemble S (described by the quantum state φ) in which each individual
I-system has some fixed (objectively existing) value bj . On the other hand, there
exist I-quantities for which we cannot assume that their have definite (”objective”)
values for elements s ∈ S. If A is such an I-quantity, then its values are generated in
the process of a measurement Ma over elements of the S. This measurement does
not imply a discontinuous collapse of the state φ to the state φa corresponding to
the fixed value a of A. In the contrary this value a of A is created in the long process
of the interaction between an I-system and a measurement device18. There is the
clear evidence that at least cognitive systems have hidden I-variables (I-states
of the brain which are represented by configurations of excited neurons, see, for
example, [62], [63]) which exist objectively and determine with some probabilities
results of the Ma. In fact, these hidden I-variables (at least some of them) are
not longer hidden. The modern experimental neuroscience gives the possibility
to observe configurations of excited neurons corresponding to different reactions
(results of Ma), see, for example, [64], [65] on experiments (based on functional
magnetic resonance imaging machine) for memory neurons configurations.
18Thus the φ is also related to individual I-systems.
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Remark 10.1. (Distribution of cognitive information in real space) Let k ≥
m > 1 be natural numbers. We introduce a map
jmk : Zm → [0, 1], x =
∞∑
l=0
αjm
j → xR =
∞∑
l=0
αl
kl+1
.
We can present the speculation that one of maps jmk gives the spatial distribution
of information in a cognitive system (in the case of “one dimensional brain”).
This spatial distribution can have quite exotic structure. For example, the image
jmk(Ur(a)) of a ball Ur(a) can be a fractal (a kind of dusty set) in the real space.
This model can have some connection with frequency domain methods [66] in that
populations of cortical oscillators self-organize by frequencies; same-frequency sub-
populations of oscillators can interact in the sense that a change in phase deviation
in one will be felt by the others in the sub-population. Thus here the spatial
nearness of neurons (and even the existence of synaptic connections between two
neurons) does not guarantee that they interact.
To simplify our considerations, we consider only states which provide the con-
ventional (Kolmogorov) probability interpretation.
In what follows students can be considered as analogues of quantum particles
and professors as analogues of measurement devices. Students of a University have
to pass a test M. They have to give n answer to the question L. Denote the set
of all possible answers {aj} to L by the symbol A. If we use the coding alphabet
{0, 1, ..., p − 1}, then the elements of A can be presented by p-adic integers. To
prepare to this test, students have to read one of books B = {bj} (here bj ∈ Zp are
coding sequences for books); a student has no time for reading of more than one
book. All books give a description of the subject; but these descriptions are not
identical. The process of reading is considered as a preparation procedure Eb. It
produces a statistical ensemble S of students who have read a book bj ∈ B. The Eb
can be considered as a filter on the set of all students of University. By quantum
formalism (with the ensemble interpretation) S is described by a quantum state φ
(which is a vector in a p-adic Hilbert space). This state is presented in the form:
φ =
∑
cjφj , (25)
where cj = gj + ifj, gj , fj ∈ Q and φj is a quantum state which describes the
statistical sub-ensemble Sj of S consisting of students who have read the book bj .
The number vj = cj c¯j gives the frequency of students s ∈ Sj in S, i.e., proportional
probability |Sj|/|S| (where, for a set O, we denote its cardinality by the symbol
|O|).
The measurement M is the process of an interaction between a quantum I-
transformer (student’s brain) and a measurement equipment (professor’s brain).
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Brains are I-systems with very complicated internal structure. A result of inter-
action between the brain of a student s ∈ S and the brain of a professor cannot
be uniquely determined by the information bj. Moreover, an attempt to verify the
condition s ∈ Sj (by an additional measurement) may change the result of the
measurement M. Therefore the property to give the answer ak as a result of the
measurementM is not an objective property of elements of the statistical ensemble
S described by φ.
Remark 10.2. We may use the notion of potentia: each s ∈ S is potentially
present in all states ψk =(the answer ak to the question L). The interaction with
the equipment induces a transition from possible to actual.
The state φ can be presented in the form:
φ =
∑
dkψk, (26)
where dk = mk + ink,mk, nk ∈ Q. Probability to obtain the answer ak is given by
the standard formula uk = dkd¯k.We could not consider probability uk as probabil-
ity with respect to a statistical ensemble. This is not proportional probability of
the form |S′k|/|S|, where S′k is a statistical sub-ensemble of S. In fact, the expan-
sion (26) provides a description of some properties of an individual system s ∈ S
(reactions of s to the question L). However, we cannot assume that φ provides a
complete description of the I-state of a cognitive system s. Thinking systems of
students can be very different19.
As usual, we introduce a diagonal operator A in a p-adic Hilbert space, Aψi =
aiψi. The spectrum of A coincides with the set of answersA. This operator provides
the quantum description of the measurement M.
As we have already noted, the act on the observation is a part of the mea-
surement process M. In our example it is important that a student must give an
answer to a professor. If we change the measurement procedure and consider a
self-observation instead of an answer to the professor, then the states ψi will be
changed (with the corresponding change of probabilities).
Finally we have to remark that the quantum I-formalism can be used to con-
struct a new model for Bohm’s pilot wave theory. In fact our approach is quite
adequate to ideas of D. Bohm and B. Hiley [67] on active information. Moreover,
it seems that the ordinary pilot wave theory might be improved by considering the
ψ-function field as a purely I-field.
19The complete description of the I-states can be obtained on the basis of hidden vari-
ables models. The use of hidden information parameters is very natural in quantum
information theory. For example, the brain contains a large number of information pa-
rameters which determine results of I-measurements. These parameters are really hidden
in the subconsciousness. The consciousness cannot control them (see [18] for the details).
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